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Foreign-Owned Companies in
the United States: Malign or
Benign?
1-4 S OREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT in the Unit-
ed States increased more than eleven-fold be-
tween 1977 and 1990, The rapid increase in
US, businesses acquired or established by for-
eign firms has generated much controversy,1
Some observers worry that foreign-owned firms
are more likely than US. firms to take actions
that would reduce employment, worsen the U.S.
trade deficit, inbihit technological progress or
threaten national security, Defenders of foreign
direct investment stress the increased economic
activity stemming from new jobs and the trans-
fer to the United States of improved manage’
ment, marketing and production techniques.
This paper examines three aspects of foreign
direct investment in the United States (FDIUS) to
assess whether foreign-owned companies are
more likely to have malign or benign effects on
the U.S. economy. First, the paper highlights the
basic facts about FDIUS—its amount, the home
countries of the foreign-owned companies, its
distribution across industries and the relative
share of the US. economy controlled by foreign
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Foreign direct investment (ED!) is the put’-
chase of ownership in, or the flow of lending
to, an enterprise located in a foreign country
that is largely owned by residents of the invest-
ing country. FDILJS results in a foreign enter-
prise operating in the United States under the
control of a firm (or individuals) of a country
other than the tjnited States, Thus, ED! is
ownership with actual control of the enterprise,
which is what distinguishes ED! from portfolio
investment.2
The official definition of FDIUS used by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis requires the in-
vesting Firm to have a minimum of 10 percent
ownership of the enterprise in the United
1ln fact, the increase in foreign ownership of all types of as-
sets in the United States has generated much controversy.
See Ott (l989) for a discussion of this broader topic.
no managerial control; rather, it establishes a claim on an
asset for the purpose of realizing some return. As noted in
the text, when a foreign firm or resident owns stock in a
firm located in the United States, the distinction between





it summarizes research on
Third, it scrutinizes the
this investment.
2Foreign portfolio investment in the United States, such as a
Japanese resident owning U.S. Treasury bonds, affordsFigure 1
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States, The use of 10 percent as the dividing
line is arbitrary, but unlikely to cause an inac-
curate measurement of FD!US because most
US, affiliates of foreign firms are majority-
owned (that is, the ownership share held by the
foreign investor exceeds 50 percent).~For exam-
ple, in 1938 the foreign parent, on average,
owned 80,7 percent of the equity of its U.S. af-
filiate. An ownership share exceeding .50 per-
cent is strong evidence of control, so any
misstatement of FDIUS is likely to be small, Jn
fact, preliminary calculations by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis reveal that raising the mini-
mum ownership percentage to 20 percent, or
even 50 percent, affects only slightly the mea-
sure of FDIUS,
The most common measure of FD!US uses the
cumulative stock of prior ED!, This measure is
the sum of foreign owners’ equity (including re-
tained earnings) for all foreign affiliates, plus
net lending to these affiliates from their par-
ents, This investment is measured at its histori-
cal cost, that is, the value of the investment
when it actually occurred. As figure 1 shows,
the book value of FD!US rose from 513,3 billion
in 1970 to 5403,7 billion in 1990, an annual
growth rate of 18,6 percent.4 This rapid growth
has made the United States the leading host
country in the world for ED!,
3Graham and Krugman (1991) provide examples to show
that the 10 percent ownership requirement can either un-
derstate or overstate FDIUS. To illustrate an understate-
ment, assume that 15 Japanese residents together own 80
percent of a firm in the United States, but that no one resi-
dent owns 10 percent or more. Even if these foreign own-
ers were not an organized group, foreign interests would
largely control such a firm. On the other hand, the treat-
ment of Du Pont illustrates a case in which the official defi-
nition of FDIUS overstates the extent of foreign control.
Du Pont, 22.9 percent owned by the Bronfman family of
Canada, is classified as a Canadian firm, but foreign in-
terests do not have managerial control of the firm.
4The rapid growth of FDIUS partially reflects the rapid in-
crease in FDI worldwide. For example, according to Rutter
(1990), the world stock of FDI increased from $208 billion
in 1973 to $1,403 billion in 1989. Since FDIUS increased
faster than FDI worldwide, the U.S. share increased from
10.1 percent to 28.6 percent over this period.
Current CestUnfortunately, the use of historical cost ig-
nores the effects of both real and nominal
changes in the value of the investment. For ex-
ample, changes in the earnings prospects of a
foreign-owned firm in the United States can
change the value of a specific investment, and
changes in the overall price level can affect the
value of ED! generally. These drawbacks
prompted the development of two other meas-
ures of FDI. The first, called current cost,
re-values investment using estimates of the cur-
rent value of the net stock of direct investment
capital, land and inventories, A second, more
general measure is the market value of a firm’s
net worth, This measure implicitly values both
tangible and intangible assets, such as patents
and trademarks, because a firm’s net worth is
the difference between its assets and liabilities,
The current cost and market value measures,
also shown in figure 1, reveal two facts. First,
like the book value measure, both have grown
rapidly in recent years and, second, both differ
from the book value of FDIUS. Between 1982
and 1990, the current cost value of FDIUS in-
creased from 5173,2 billion to $465.9 billion, an
annual growth rate of 13,2 percent, while the
market value measure increased from $133.0
billion to $530.4 billion, an annual growth rate
of 18.9 percent. These different growth rates
have resulted in a book value of FDIUS for 1990
that is 87 percent of the current cost value and
76 percent of the market value.
By themselves, these levels of FD!US are not
especially revealing. One way to provide per-
spective is to examine the counterpart of EDIUS,
the levels of FDI held by U.S. firms. Not only is
the United States the leading host country in
the world for ED!, it is also the leading source
country. Despite the rapid growth of FD!US,
FDI held by US. firms as of 1990 exceeds
FDIUS, irrespective of the method of measure-
ment. For example, EDI held by U.S. firms in
1990 was $421.5 billion using the book value,
$598.1 billion using current cost value and
$714.1 billion using the market value, Thus, FDI
held by U.S. firms exceeded FDIUS by $17.8 bil-
lion, $132.2 billion or $183.7 billion, respec-
tively.
A second way to provide perspective is to cal-
culate the ratio of FDIUS to the total net worth
of U.S non-financial corporations (using the
book value of each). Between 1977 and 1990,
according to Graham and Krugman (1991), this
ratio increased from 2.1 percent to 10.5 per-
cent. This suggests “foreign control” of about 10
percent of the US. economy.5
Another way to assess the extent of foreign
control is to examine the share of U.S. workers
employed by foreign-owned firms. Between
1977 and 1988, employment at non-bank
foreign.affiliated firms rose from 1.7 percent to
4.3 percent of all U.S. non-bank employment.°
When one focuses only on the manufacturing
sector, the share rises from 3.5 percent to 8.9
percent.
No matter which measure is used, foreign
ownership and control have increased substan-
tially in recent years.’ The level of foreign con-
trol, however, is not as high as it is in most
other developed countries, For example, accord-
ing to Julius and Thomsen (1988), the share of
foreign-owned firms’ manufacturing employ-
ment in 1986 was 7 percent in the United
States, 21 percent in France, 13 percent in Ger-
many, 14 percent in the United Kingdom and 1
percent in Japan. Except for Japan, the rapid in-
crease in FDIUS has made the level of foreign
control in the United States closer to that of
other developed countries.
EDIUS occurs in either of two ways. One way,
termed “greenfield” investment, involves the
construction of new production facilities in the
United States—either brand new subsidiaries or
expansions of existing subsidiaries, The other
method of FDIUS is the acquisition of existing
U.S. firms. Despite some greenfield investments
5There are problems with such an assessment. First, both
the numerator and the denominator are measured accord-
ing to book value, A better measure would use market
values. Since the market value of FDIUS exceeds the book
value, the numerator would clearly increase. To determine
how the ratio would change, the market value of U.S. non-
financial corporations is required. This might produce a
reduction in the ratio, Another problem is that this ratio
does not measure the extent to which these claims are
leveraged through less than 100 percent ownership and
borrowing from unrelated parties into control over
a larger amount of assets. For example, a foreign investor
with 80 percent ownership of a company with $100 million
in assets controls $100 million in assets, but the measure
of FDIUS indicates control of only $80 million (80 percent
of $100 million),
8For 1977, see Graham and Krugman (1991), page 12 and,
for 1988, see Survey ofCurrent Business, July 1991,
page 77,
7Figures for 1990 and 1991 reveal a slowdown of FDIUS, It
is premature to say whether the smaller flows are tem-














Acquisitions $9.0 $18.2 $6.6 $4.8 $11.8 $20.1 $31.5 $33$ $64.9 $59.7 $56.8
Establishments 3.2 5,1 42 3.2 3.4 3.0 7.7 6.4 7.8 11.5 7,7
1Eigures are preliminary.
SOURCE: BEA, U.S. Businesses Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Investors in 1990?’ Survey of Current Business,
May 1990, supplementary tables 5 and 11; see various issues of the Survey of Current Business for prior years.
that have generated much publicity, such as the
opening of Japanese.owned automobile plants,
FD!US has occurred primarily by way of acqui-
sitions. Table 1 shows the relative dominance of
acquisitions from 1980 to 1990. For example,
the $56.8 billion outlay in 1990 by foreign firms
to acquire existing firms was more than seven
times larger than the $7.7 billion outlay to es-
tablish new subsidiaries.
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EDIUS occurs in various industries and in-
volves numerous, primarily developed, foreign
countries. As figure 2 shows, the United King-
dom, whose share of EDIUS was 26.8 percent in
1990, is the leading source country. The other
leading investors and their shares in 1990 are:
Japan—20.7 percent; the Netherlands—15,9 per-
cent; Germany—6.9 percent; and Canada—6.9
percent. Despite having a smaller share than the
British, Japanese FDIUS has generated much
more publicity than British EDIUS. Part of the
reason for this attention is due to the industries
in which the Japanese are involved, of which
more is said later, and part is due to the rapid
rise of Japanese FD!US in the 1980s. Between
1980 and 1990, Japanese FDIUS increased at an
annual rate of 33.3 percent, boosting the
Japanese share from 5.7 percent to 20.7
percent.
Table 2 shows that the largest share of FDIUS
remains in manufacturing. Between 1980 and
1990, investment in this sector increased nearly
fivefold. Since total EDIUS increased similarly,
the manufacturing share of F’DIUS was slightly
less than 40 percent in both 1980 and 1990.
The United Kingdom is the leading foreign in-
vestor in manufacturing by a wide margin. In
1990, its share was 33.1 percent, more than
double the Netherlands’ 15.3 percent. The other
leading investors are: Germany—9.5 percent;
Japan—9.5 percent; and Canada—5.8 percent.
The largest portion (26 percent) of manufactur-
ing EDIUS in 1990 was in chemicals, followed
by machinery (18.5 percent), food processing
(14.3 percent) and primary and fabricated me-
tals (11 percent).
The wholesale and retail trade sector has the
second-largest share of FD!US. Its share was
15.4 percent in 1990, down from 18.3 percent
in 1980. These shares, however, are likely over-
stated because of the method used to allocate
industry statistics: wholesale trade in automo-
biles includes some manufacturing of automo-
biles. As automobile production by
Japanese-owned affiliates increases, sales of au-
tomobiles manufactured in the United States
will rise relative to the sales of automobiles im-
ported from Japan for resale. As this occurs,
more affiliates will be reclassified from whole-
sale trade into manufacturing, causing reported
FD!US in transportation equipment manufactur-
ing to rise and FD!US in wholesale trade to fall.
Finance and insurance accounted for 9.7 per-
cent of FDIUS in 1990, up from 8.9 percent in
1980. Countries with major financial markets—
Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada
and the United Kingdom—account for the
majority of this investment.
The share of FDIUS in petroleum, the fourth-
leading industry, declined from 14.7 percent in
1980 to 9.4 percent in 1990. According to Rut-
ter (1991), there were fewer acquisitions in
petroleum than in most other industries during
the decade. In fact, both foreign and domestic
investment in the petroleum industry grew rela-
tively slowly during the 1980s.
The remaining industries, real estate and
banking, are probably the most controversial.Figure 2
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The share of FD!US in real estate increased tions, such as Hawaii, downtown Los Angeles
from 7.3 percent in 1980 to 8.6 percent in 1990. and Houston and a few other urban areas.
The $34.6 billion of real estate FDIUS reflects Some foreign ownership may also go unreport-
the investment of foreign parents in U.S. affili- ed; however, Graham and Krugman (1991) con-
ates whose major activity is real estate, Large dude its importance is likely to be small. A final
amounts of U.S. real estate are also held by af- cause of controversy is the large share of
filiates classified in other industries. Thus, the Japanese ownership.~
actual level of real estate FD!US exceeds $34.6
-. , , The Japanese also play a prominent role in billion. In addition, the value of assets actually
the FDIUS that has occurred in banking. Be-
controlled by foreign owners is likely much
- tween 1980 and 1990, the share of FDIUS in greater because of the high debt leverage in
-. . . banking declined from 5.5 percent to 4.7 per-
this industry (foreign investors are able to con-
- cent; however, foreign ownership in the U.S.
trol real estate valued far greater than their ..
banking industry is large and has been increas- own equity by borrowing from unrelated -
ing. In 1980, 11.9 percent of the total assets of
parties). .-
all U.S. banks were held by financial affiliates of
Some of the controversy surrounding this in- foreign banks and holding companies. By 1990,
vestment is because foreign ownership of real this figure had risen to 21.2 percent, more than
estate tends to be concentrated in a few loca- half of which is held by Japanese-owned banks.~
°TheU.S-Japanese controversy encompasses much more 9For a more complete discussion of FDIUS in banking, see
than Japanese ownership of real estate in the United Lund (1991).
States. For an examination of one of the key sources of
controversy, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Japan, see
Butler (1991).Table 2
Foreign Direct Investment i





Industry Level Share Level Share
Manufacturing $33.0 39.8% $160.0 39.6%
Wholesale and Retail
Trade 15.2 18.3 62.0 15,4
Finance and Insurance 7.4 8.9 39.3 9.7
Petroleum 12,2 14.7 38.0 9,4
Real Estate 6,1 7,3 34.6 8.6
Banking 4.6 5.5 19.1 4.7
Other Industries 4,5 5.4 50.7 12.6
Total $83.0 100.0 $403.7 100.0
SOURCES: Data for 1980 from BEA, ‘Foreign Direct In-
vestmentin theUnited States in 1983,” Survey
of Current Business 64, no. 10 (October) 1984,
table 12; data for 1990 from BEA, “The Inter-
national Investment Position of the United
States in 1990,” Survey ofCurrent Business
71, no. 6 (June) 1991, table 7.
Much research has been devoted to develop-
ing theoretical explanations of FDI. ‘I’he impor-
tance of specific factors that might explain
FDIUS has also been examined thoroughly.
Rather than provide an in-depth review of this
voluminous literature, let’s examine the primary
explanation of FDI, which is based on the
“industrial-organization” approach, and the com-
monly identified determinants of FDI, It is im-
portant to stress that this explanation is most
useful in discussing FDI in manufacturing.
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Standard FDI theories rely on “firm-specific
advantages” to explain why it occurs,’°The for-
eign investor must have some advantage over
local firms to compensate for the fact that the
multinational corporation (MNC) incurs addition-
al costs because of 1) cultural, legal, institutional
and linguistic differences; 2) a lack of
knowledge about local market conditions; and 3)
lengthier lines of communication and, therefore,
an increase in communication failures.
A foreign investor’s advantages can take many
forms. Technology is the primary advantage; ac-
cess to large amounts of capital, superior
management and products differentiated by suc-
cessful advertising are also important.
A foreign company’s advantages are exploited
by FDJ only if, given its information and expec-
tations about prices, costs and legal environ-
ment, it can earn higher profits. Any technologi-
cal advantage, defined broadly as economically
valuable knowledge, can be exploited by exports
to a country instead of foreign production and
sales in that same country. Thus, the firm
selects FDJ over exporting only if the former is
more profitable. FDI and exporting, however,
are not the only alternatives. A firm with a
technological advantage may license a firm in
another country to produce a good using its
technology.” Once again, the firm with the
technological advantage will choose the route
with the highest anticipated profits.
Firm-specific advantages have led scholars to
develop theories of FDI in which the MNC has
some unique market power.12 Two variants of
the so-called industrial-organization approach,
one most closely associated with Hymer (1976)
and the other with Magee (1977), demonstrate
this approach.
in Hymer’s view, because a foreign direct in-
vestor is one of a small number of producers of
a specific good, the firm can affect the price of
the good by altering its production. By decreas-
ing its production, the firm can force the mar-
ket price higher and vice versa. The MNC,
according to Hymer, uses FDI strategically to
limit competition and protect its market power.
Thus, the MNC engages in FDI to beat its com-
petitors into a particular foreign market.
10An alternative theory explains FDI by requiring that foreign majority of worldwide FDI, often occurs in both directions,
firms have access to capital at a lower cost than domestic raise doubts about the cost of capital explanation.
firms. As Graham and Krugman (1991) point out, this ap- ilFor an elementary discussion of the choice among FDI, ex-
proach is sublect to serious criticisms, First, foreign inves- porting and licensing by firms in the beer brewing industry,
tors with relatively lower capital costs can achieve higher see Karrenbrock (1990).
returns by portfolio investments as well as by FDI. There-
fore, this approach does not differentiate among various 125ee Cantwell (1991) and Graham and Krugman (1991), ap-
types of investment. In addition, the facts that, first, FDI is pendix B, for summaries of industrial-organization explana-
frequently financed by funds provided by the host country tions of FDI.
and, second, FDI among developed countries, which is theSome concerns have been raised about FDI in
this context because of fears that the foreign in-
vestor, as part of the firm’s commitment to in-
vestment, will extract promises from the host
government to limit imports from other compet-
itors or prevent EDI by other competitors. If
this were to happen, there would be little com-
petition in the host country for the foreign in-
vestor, Consumers would ultimately pay higher
prices than they would in the absence of trade
or investment restrictions.
in Magee’s view, which is known as the ap-
propriability theory, the firm-specific advantages
that stimulate FDI do not reduce competition in
product markets. Even though firm-specific ad-
vantages allow the MNC to generate profits,
they do not imply that the firm will necessarily
have market power in product markets. Rather,
FDI allows the benefits of technology to spread.
EDI is necessary for the firm to “appropriate”
the potential gains from its technology. General-
ly speaking, the reasons to favor FDT over the
explicit sale of the advantage to outsiders
revolve around the difficulties involved in mar-
ket transactions. In some cases, the technology
involved in an activity, such as running a facto-
ry, is spread among members of a group. Since
the knowledge is not easily summarized or com-
municated, it is hard to package and sell. Such
a market transfer is complicated further be-
cause it is difficult for a potential buyer to de-
cide how much the knowledge is worth. If the
buyer had sufficient information to value the
knowledge, he would likely know as much as
the seller and, thus, have no reason to buy the
“technology.”
The appropriabilitv theory, therefore, stresses
the importance of the transfer of technology
from one country to another within an MNC,
Restrictions on FDI limit the transfer of the
firm-specific advantages of MNCs. Since these
advantages contribute to rising productivity and
incomes, restrictions on FDI flows into a country
can harm that country’s economic performance.
The rapid rise of FDIUS since the late 1970s
has prompted much research that attempts to
isolate specific factors that explain it. Since FDI
theory sti-esses the importance of technological
differences, the role of technology in the rapid
growth of FDIUS is examined first, The effects
of exchange rate changes, taxation, protectionist
Table 3
Royalties and License Fees (millions of
dollars)
Receipts of Payments by
iS, affiliates U.S. affiliates
from foreign to foreign
parents parents










growth rate 21 7°/c 22 0%
SOURCE: BEA “Fo~e.gnDirect lnveslmenl in the United
Stales: Detail !or Pos:tion and Balance of Pay-
ments Flows,’ Survey of Current Bus,nvss,
varous issues
pressures and the business cycle on I l)lU~iill’
then explored.
‘rhe preceding views of FDI stress the impor-
tance of the transfer of technology from a par-
ent to its foreign affiliate, MNCs, however, can
also transfer technology from the affiliate to the
parent. Rapid increases in foreign direct invest-
ment in the United States during the 1980s have
worried some observers that foreign firms are
investing primarily to acquire US. technology,
which could harm the competitive position of
U.S. firms.
One way to assess international transfers of
technology involving U.S. affiliates of foreign-
based MNCs is to compare receipts of royalties
and license feesfrom their foreign parents with
payments of such fees to their foreign parents.
Receipts measure the value of technology trans-
ferred from foreign-owned companies in the
United States to their parents, while payments
measure purchases of technology from their
parents. According to table 3, both measures
have increased at annual rates of more than 20
percent since 1982, Payments by US, affiliates,
however, far exceed receipts in each year and
were nearly six times the value of receipts in1990, Thus, technology transfers are occurring
to a far greater extent from foreign-based MNCs
to their American affiliates than the reverse.
While the preceding evidence is consistent
with FDI theory, it still does not explain why
FDIUS has risen faster than FDI by US, firms.
Once again, the role of technology in FDI the-
on’ provides insights. One explanation revolves
around the shrinking and, in some cases, rever-
sal of U.S. technological superiority. Generally
speaking, from the end of World War H until
1970, U.S-based firms had substantial advan-
tages over foreign-based firms in technology
and management skills, ‘these advantages
caused FDI abroad by V.5.-based firms to ex-
ceed FDIUS. Over the last 20 years, however,
foreign-based firms have developed such advan-
tages of their own to a far greater extent than
they had previously; these advantages have
provided a stimulus to FDIUS.” Thus, the in-
creasing role of foreign firms in US. pt’oduction
can be related to changing patterns of the de-
velopment of new technology and management
innovations throughout the world.”
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While a pre-eminent role in explaining FDIUS
can be ascribed to technology, other factors can
affect FDIUS. One common argument is that a
“weak” foreign exchange value of the dollar en-
courages EDIUS, In many discussions, a weak
dollar is not defined formally, hut is used infor-
mally as a value lower than its value at some
previous point. The lower value of the dollar
has two effects that could stiniulate FDIUS,
First, it deters exports to the United States as
U.S. consumers are faced with higher prices.
‘therefore, foreign firms might find it more at-
tractive to locate production in the United
States rather than export a smaller quantity. Sec-
ond, the lower value of the dollar- makes U.S.
pi-oductive assets cheaper for foreign firms than
they were previously.
While a weak dollar makes production in the
United States more attractive, all other things
the same, it is crucial to emphasize that FDIUS
depends on whether the U.S. productive assets
are worth more to a foreign-based firm than to
a U.S-based firm, A declining dollar raises the
expected returns to both a US, owner and a
foreign owner. How might the expected returns
rise more for the latter than the former?
One argument focuses on the changing corn-
position of production in the United States, As
the dollar declines, U.S. competitiveness shifts
from non-traded sectors, such as services and
retail trade, to traded sectors, such as manufac-
turing. Since FDI is more substantial in traded
than non-traded sectors, production in the Unit-
ed States shifts from areas in which foreign-
owned companies have little involvement to
areas in which they have much more involve-
ment,’5
ft is unclear exactly what impact changes in
the foreign exchange value of the dollar have
on FDIUS.’°What is clear is that the long-run
upward trend in FDIUS beginning in the late
1970s took place during a strengthening as well
as a weakening of the dollar, Thus, the evi-
dence suggests that changes in the value of the
dollar are, at most, a factor that has had slight
effects,
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Changes in tax policy have also been viewed
as a potential determinant of FDIUS, Two major
changes in U.S. tax policy in 1981 and 1986 may
have contributed to the timing of changes in the
rate of FDIUS. To assess the impact US, tax
changes on FDIUS, such changes must be
viewed in conjunction with the tax systems of
the source countries.
Generally speaking, two types of tax systems
can he identified in the leading source countries
for FDIUS. Countries with “territorial” corporate
taxation, like the Netherlands and Canada, do
13Kudrle (1991) notes that four recent books on FDIUS agree
that the share of advantages held by firms based outside
the United States has grown substantially relative to U.S.-
based firms in recent years. See Chandler (1986) for a his-
tory of MNCs and global competition.
“Ray (1991) provides evidence that superior management
underlies many acquisitions, while technological advan-
tages of new physical capital and of relatively large operat-
ing plants have stimulated greenfield investments.
1~Arelated argument by Froot and Stein (1989) highlights the
mole of relative wealth effects, A declining dollar raises
the value of foreign firms compared with U.S. firms. If firms
are limited in their borrowing capacity by their debt-equity
ratios, the declining dollar raises the purchasing power of
foreign firms. This may allow a foreign firm to outbid a U.S.
firm in an attempt to acquire assets in the United States.
“Identifying the impact of exchange rate changes is compli-
cated by the necessity of distinguishing between temporary
and permanent changes. If an exchange rate change is
viewed as temporary, a firm’s choice between exporting
and FDI is unlikely to be affected.
:4, 4/:c4454’4,’,4 4//I. MV flC ‘47 / r,, /4/Inot attempt to tax the income earned by the
subsidiaries of firms based in their countries.
Countries with “worldwide” systems, like the
United Kingdom and Japan, tax the earnings of
subsidiaries while granting a tax credit for taxes
paid to host-country governments. For example,
under a worldwide system, subsidiaries of for-
eign firms pay corporate profit taxes similar to
those paid by domestic firms, When they
repatriate income to their parent, the income is
subject to taxation at the home-country rate,
with a credit for taxes paid to the US.
government.
The differing tax systems provide different in-
vestment incentives for given U,S, tax changes.
In the early 1980s, U.S. corporate taxes were
reduced by accelerated depreciation al-
lowances,’~B)’ allowing firms to reduce theii-
taxable incomes, these cuts were valuable to
US-owned corporations. The cuts should also
have been valuable to foreign firms, though
they were more valuable to those subject to ter-
ritorial rather than worldwide taxation, Firms
subject to worldwide taxation faced the offset-
ting effects of reduced tax credits.
Overall, the tax cuts provided relatively more
benefits to US-owned firms than foreign-owned
firms and, thus, were biased against F’DLUS, In
addition, the bias against firms from the United
Kingdom and Japan, countries with worldwide
systems, was greater than against firms from
the Netherlands and Canada, countries with ter-
ritorial systems, These incentives were reduced
in 1986 when tax legislation eliminated the spe-
cial investment incentive.s.
Generally speaking, little empirical evidence
suggests that tax rate changes have played a
major role in FD1US. The share of FIJIUS from
the Netherlands and Canada relative to Japan
and the United Kingdom did not rise from 1981
to 1986 and fall thereafter, Slemrod (1990) also
fails to find that tax changes affect FUIUS.
There is, however, some empirical evidence
that changes in taxes matter, The preceding ar-
gument suggested that US. tax cuts deterred
FDIUS, while tax increases encouraged FIJIUS.
Extending this argument across industries,
FD1US should be higher in industries subject to
higher tax rates on capital. In fact, Swensen
(1990) has found such a positive association;
Klein and Hosengren (1991), on the other hand,
found no such association. In addition, Auer-
bach and Hassett (1991) found no evidence that
the 1986 tax changes have influenced FDIUS.
overall, the empirical evidence points, at most,
to a very small role for tax policy in affecting
FD1US.
Another’ factor identified as a potential deter-
minant of FDTUS is actual or potential protec-
tionist measures, The basic idea is that a trade
harrier, or the threat of imposing one, will in-
duce FI]IUS because the profitability of produc-
tion in the United States by the foreign-oxvned
firm would rise relative to exporting to the
United States. Underlying such behavior, of
course, is some advantage possessed by the
foreign-owned firm.
The fact that trade barriers are frequently
thought of as protecting US-owned firms is
ironic. In fact, such protection tends to increase
foreign control in the US. economy. A domestic
industry demanding protection is likely to he
one in which foreign firms have special advan-
tages. ‘i’rade barriers erected in that industry
simply attract F’DILJS, stimulating additional
foreign-owned production.
Protectionism has played a role in F’DIUS.”
The production of automobiles and color televi-
sion sets are two examples.” Nonetheless, pro-
tectionism is not likely to have become so large
a factor that it can explain the rapid increase in
FD1US,
‘~A depreciation allowance reflects the reduction in the value
of assets arising from their use in producing goods and
services. For tax purposes, these allowances reduce net
profit and, therefore, taxes. An acceleration of these al-
lowances means that larger reductions in the values of as-
sets are recognized earlier in their productive lives,
“See Ray (1991) for empirical evidence that the desire to cir-
cumvent trade restrictions has motivated FDIUS.
“See Graham and Krugman (1991) for brief case studies of
production in the United States of both automobiles and
color television sets. The authors state that by the
mid-1970s Japanese producers of color television sets had
developed better designs and production systems than U.S.
producers. As a result, Japanese producers were able to
produce higher quality sets at lower prices than US.
producers. U.S. producers sought and received protection
from their foreign competitors in the form of a ceiling on
the quantity of color television sets exported to the United
States. To evade the export limitation, Japanese firms sim-
ply established production facilities in the United States
and used their advantages to outperform their U.S. compe-
titors. Thus, in this industry, the voluntary export restraint
stimulated FDIUS,~.:fr’
A final factor affecting FDIUS is the business
cycle. The business cycle characterizes the ex-
tent to which the level of economic activity in
the United States and abroad changes over time,
Julius (1991), in a study of inflows into France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States found that FDI rose faster than
output during economic recoveries and fell
faster during recessions,2°Changes in economic
activity, however, are not likely to affect the
relative shares of foreign- vs. U.S--controlled
production substantially because the business
cycle affects the profit expectations of foreign
and domestic investors similarly.
The major controversies about the effects of
FDIUS encompass economic as well as political
issues,” In addition, there are national security
issues that involve economic and political con-
siderations. This paper, however, examines the
issues that are primarily economic,”
FDI facilitates the movement across national
borders of goods, services and, most important,
technology by reducing some transaction costs
that inhibit trade, For example, reaching an
agreement to transfer technology within a MNC
is much easier (that is, less costly) than it is
with two separate companies.
The benefits of the trade stimulated by the
expansion of MNCs come from three sources.
The first source is known as comparative ad-
vantage. Countries have different combinations
of productive resources, and goods are
produced with different combinations of these
resources, Trade allows countries to benefit by
ptoducing goods that, relative to other coun-
tries, they can produce and sell cheaply and ex-
changing them for goods that can be produced
and sold more cheaply abroad, The second
source of gains from trade requires increasing
returns to scale, With trade, countries can
produce a narrower range and larger quantities
of goods than they could otherwise, Longer
production runs may allow firms to achieve
lower per unit production costs. Finally, trade
reduces the power of firms to set prices (that is,
increases competition) and allows consumers to
enjoy larger quantities and lower prices.
Looking specifically at trade in technology,
FDI allows a firm to appropriate (or capture)
the benefits of its own research and develop-
ment. When the foreign investor produces
goods and services using its own technology, it
is as if there were trade in the results of
research and development. From the firm’s
point of view, its appropriation of benefits pro-
vides the incentive to engage in research and
development in the first place. The data in table
3 illustrates the importance of trade in technolo-
gy. Recall that, for 1990, the value of technolo-
gy transferred from foreign parents to U.S.
affiliates was nearly six times that transferred
from U.S. affiliates to their foreign parents.
Proponents of FDI frequently stress the gener-
ation of what are termed “external benefits.”
Foreign firms may not be able to appropriate all
of the gains from the technology they transfer.
Instead, domestic firms can learn and imitate
the transferred technology and management
methods, and workers may take their acquired
skills and use them in other jobs, Unfortunately,
these external benefits are difficult to measure.
On the other hand, critics argue that FDIUS
tends to reduce the spillover of external
benefits, particularly those associated with en-
gaging in research and development. Research
and development involves many complex in-
tellectual activities undertaken by highly skilled
employees, Critics suggest that these activities
tend to be located near the headquarters of the
parent firm. Since the headquarters of foreign-
owned firms are located outside the United
States, some are concerned that research and
development activities might be shifted out of
the United States, For example, as more of the
‘°Similarly,Ray (1991) found that FDIUS is associated with
large and growing product markets in an expanding
economy.
“Analyses of the impact of FDIUS on the U.S. economy
have been hampered because of data problems. The For-
eign Direct Investment and International Financial Data Im-
provements Act of 1990 authorizes different agencies of the
US. government to exchange confidential information
to improve the quality of data, some of which is to be pub-
lished during summer 1992. See Moczar (1991) for details.
“See Graham and Krugman (1991) for an overview of both
the political and national security issues associated with
FDIUS. One concern is that foreign-owned firms might bias
U.S. political decisions toward their interests. Choate (1990)
argues that Japanese firms have an undue influence on
U.S. public policy.Table 4






R&D fmHiions of dollarsl $7,834 $97,889 $65,583
R&D per worker ltrlousaqds of doilarsl 2 04 1 .07 07 2
Manufactur~ng
R&D lmillions of dollars) 6.903 89.776 60,223
R&D per -worker ftnousands of dollars) 3 78 4 64 3 ii
‘Includes federally funded as well as company-funooa expend.tures
SOURCES Datafo affiliates from BEA Foreign Direct Investment in the Uriitea Slates. Op~-ations
& U.S. Aff’I,ates of Fo’e gn Companies ‘ revised 1988 estimales lahies H-i and F-I:
data for U.S. firns from Nat.onal Science Foundation Sc/ence Ind,carors fWashin9lon
National Science Foundat’o-i, 1989).
U.S. chemical industry is controlled by foreign-
owned firms, critics charge that larger shares of
research and development in this industry will
be shifted abroad,
One way to assess the importance of this
“headquarter’s” effect is to compare research
and development expenditures in the United
States by all US. firms with those by U.S. affili-
ates of foreign firms, Table 4 contains summary
information about research and development
that runs counter to the headquarters effect ar-
gument, As the table shows, research and de-
velopment expenditures per worker for all
industries were nearly twice as large for affili-
ates of foreign firms ($2,040) than for all U,S,
firms ($1,070). If one limits research and de-
velopment expenditum’es to those that are
company-funded, the difference becomes even
larger.
These differences partially reflect the industri-
al composition of FDIUS, because most research
and development occurs in manufacturing. US.
manufacturing firms spend larger amounts per
employee on research and development ($4,640)
than U.S. affiliates of foreign firmns ($3,780), a
pattern that is reversed when only company-
funded expenditures ($3,110) are counted, All in
all, there is little evidence that a headquarters
effect exists.
/ “4
Without question, the most controversy about
FDIUS concerns employment. Advocates of
FD1LIS suggest that the rising number of US.
employees in foreign-owned firms rept-esents
the creation of new jobs, Critics stress that
FDIUS is a dynamic process, which may or may
not create jobs. While critics concede that new
plants and expansions of existing plants lead to
the creation of new jobs, they reject the general
presumption that acquisitions create new jobs.
For acquisitions to create jobs, one would have
to argue that, without the foreign purchase, the
jobs in the acquired firm would have been
eliminated and no other US, firm would have
expanded following the closing of an acquired
t’irm. Such an argument strains credibility, A
more realistic view is that acquisitions have lit-
tle effect on jobs and primarily reflect the trans-
fer of jobs from US, to foreign owner’s,”
Graham and Krugman (1991) argue that the
focus on job creation reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of how the US, macroecono-
my functions, The supply of labor is the key de-
“Glickman and Woodward (1989) stress that the lob creation
effects of FDIUS have been “much less than meets the
eye1Table 5
Compensation per Worker in U.S. Firms and U.S. Affiliates of
Foreign Firms, 1987 (thousands of dollars)
Industry U.S. affiliates All U.S. firms




Food and kindred products 27.3 27.4
Chemicals and allieo products 38.2 41 1
Primary and fabricated metals 36.1 33.1
Machinery 32.3 35.0
Other manufacturing 29.8 26.4
Wholesale trade 33.9 30.0
Retail trade 12.9 13.6
Finance. insurance and real estate1 51 2 31 5
Banking na, 272
All other industries 29 3 23.9
na, not available,
‘Excluding banking.
SOURCES: Data on U.S affiliates from BEA. Foreign Direct Investment in tne United States. Oper-
ations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companes.” revised 1987 estimates, table F-i: data
on all U.S firms from ‘National Income and Product Accounts.” Survey ofCurrent Busi-
ness 70. no 7 (July) 1990, tables 6.48 and 6.68.
terminant of employment in the long run. Ag-
gregate demand for goods and services and,
thus, the demand for labor, can vary in the
short run, causing employment to change;
however, in the long run, the economy will
move toward its so-called natural rate of unem-
ployment, This rate is unaffected by the degree
of foreign ownership of firms in the United
States. Thus, the net impact of FDIUS on U.S.
employment is negligible.
More important than the number of jobs as-
sociated with FIJIUS is the types of jobs.’~This
issue is frequently described as “good” jobs are
being replaced by “bad” jobs. One argument is
that foreign-based firms prefer to engage in
high-wage activities at home, while engaging in
low-wage activities in the United States. Some
contrary evidence has already been presented.
For example, there is no evidence that foreign-
based firms perform research and development
in the United States, a high-wage activity, to a
lesser degree than U.S. firms do.
Another way to examine job quality is to com-
pare the wages of workers employed by foreign
owners with those of U.S. owners. Table 5 indi-
cates that compensation per worker in U,S, af-
filiates of foreign firms is comparable to that in
U.S. firms. For all industries, pay by U.S. affili~
ates of foreign firms was $29,800 in 1987, sub-
stantially more than the $24,200 paid by U.S.
firms, This difference, however, is primarily be-
cause the distribution of FDIUS tends to be
more pronounced in higher-paying industries
than US, investment generally.
Looking at specific industries, there is little
difference in compensation per worker between
the two sets of firms, except in petroleum and
finance, insurance and real estate. For example,
workers employed by U.S. affiliates of foreign
firms in the primary and fabricated metals
‘4fleich (1991) argues that a nation’s standard of living is in-
creasingly dependent on the value of the skills and in-
sights that its workers contribute to the world economy-
Since workers learn by doing, a foreign-owned firm that
hires Americans to either solve or identify complex
problems helps the U.S. standard of living to a greater
degree than a US-owned firm that contracts with foreign
workers to do the same. In such an environment, the key
to well-being is to increase the skill levels of workers,Table 6
manufacturing sector averaged $3,000 more in
compensation than all U.S. workers in this sec-
tor. Meanwhile, in the chemicals and allied
products manufacturing sector, the former
averaged $2,900 less than the latter. Thus, there
is no evidence that FULUS is causing good (high-
paying) jobs to be replaced by bad (low-paying)
jobs.
Another source of controversy concerns the
export and import activity of foreign-owned
firms in the United States. Critics charge that
foreign-owned firms are major contributors to
US, trade deficits. ‘I’able 6 provides data on
which such charges are based.
Comparing parent companies of U.S-based
MNCs in manufacturing with U.S. affiliates of
foreign firms in manufacturing, one finds that
U.S. affiliates of foreign firms export less per
worker ($13,780 vs. $15,070) and import more
per worker ($17,920 vs. $7,060) than parent
companies of U.S-based MNCs.’5 Caution is re-
quired in interpreting these numbers, however.’°
First, to infer that, on average, when a foreign
firm acquires a firm in the United States, im-
ports per worker will more than double, is
inappropriate. There is no reason to expect the
newly acquired firm to change its trading pat-
tern substantially simply because of a change
in owners.
Second, especially with greenfield investments,
FDI in manufacturing frequently begins with as-
sembly operations that require many imported
inputs; however, over time, local sourcing
grows. Japanese auto manufacturing in the
United States provides an example of how local
content has increased over time. For example,
the General Accounting Office (1990) reported
that the U.S. content of output by Japanese-
owned U.S. automobile affiliates increased from
38 percent in 1988 to 50 percent in 1989.
Closely related is the fact that FDIUS might be
displacing imports. In other words, the produc-
25Graham and Krugman (1991) argue that using all industries
rather than manufacturing only overstates the differences
between U.S—based MNCs and U.S. affiliates of foreign
companies. These numbers, which show that U,S. affiliates
of foreign firms both export and import more per worker
($18,090 vs. $12,010 and $40,460 vs. $10,010, respectively),
are misleading because some foreign-owned firms are
primarily trading branches, For example, the trading opera-
tions of Japanese automobile firms are foreign-owned and,
as a result, have a large effect on the import numbers.
‘6The accuracy of imports per worker by U.S. affiliates of for-
eign firms is important for assessing the profitability of
FDIUS, Lawrence (1990) and others have noted that FDIUS
has not been especially profitable, For example, the ratio of
income to equity for FDIUS in manufacturing in 1987 was
5.9 percent, less than half the 12.8 percent return in US.
manufacturing. One explanation is that foreign-owned com-
panies under-report their U.S. earnings by overstating the
cost of imports purchased from their parents, If under-
taken, this practice, termed transfer pricing, shifts profits
and tax revenue from the United States to foreign coun-
tries. An alternative explanation, supported empirically in a
study released by the Organization for International Invest-
ment (1992), stresses the rapid growth of FDIUS relative to
investment by other corporations. The rapid growth of
FDIUS has caused foreign-owned companies to incur sub-
stantial start-up costs and large expenses for interest and
depreciation, causing their net income and pre-tax rates of
return to fall below that of corporations in general.
Employment and Foreign Trade
filiates of Foreign Firms, 1988
of U.S. Multinational Corporations and U.S. Af-
U.S. multinationals Affiliates of foreign firms
All Industries Manufacturing All industries Manufacturing
Employment (thousands of workers) 17,935.2 9,815,0 3,844.2 1,828.6
Exports (millions of dollars) $215,392 $147,882 $69,541 $25,192
Imports (millions ofdollars) 179,543 69,340 155,533 32,762
Exports per worker (thousands of dollars) 12,01 15.07 18.09 13.78
Imports per worker (thousands of dollars) 10.01 7,06 40.46 17.92
SOURCE Graham and Krugman (1991) p 66tion associated with FDIUS could reduce im-
ports. For example, prior to Japanese automo-
bile production in the United States, purchases
of Japanese automobiles were entirely imports.
Now, even though the typical Japanese automo-
bile produced in the United States might have
less U.S. content than the typical U.S. automo-
bile produced in the United States, the fact that
some portion of the Japanese automobile is
produced in the United States means less im-
ports than previously.
Finally, it is important to note that the trading
behavior of foreign-owned firms, like trading
behavior in general, is beneficial. The technolo-
gy being transferred from foreign firms to their
US, affiliates, which the affiliate is importing,
makes the affiliate more productive and, thus,
more competitive. Similar statements can be
made about other imported inputs. To the ex-
tent that trade allows the U.S. affiliate to make
better use of its resources, the U.S, economy
gains.
No matter how it is measured, foreign direct
investment in the United States has increased
substantially since the late 1970s, primarily via
acquisitions. The current level of foreign owner-
ship, however, is not high relative to that in
most other developed countries. In addition, the
foreign direct investment of US. firms still ex-
ceeds FDIUS,
Overall, the rise in FDJUS can be viewed as
the result of technological developments abroad
that are being transferred to the United States.
Other factors have also affected FDIUS, There is
general agreement, for example, that the busi-
ness cycle affects FDJUS and that, in some in-
dustries, the threat of protectionism or
protectionism itself has influenced the invest-
ment decisions of foreign firms. Foreign ex-
change and tax rate changes have had, at most,
slight effects,
The transfers of technology are a positive de-
velopment in that they reflect the expectation
that production in the United States will be
profitable. For the United States as a whole, this
transfer of technology allows resources to be
more productive, not only in the industry
directly affected by the FDI, but also possibly in
other industries because of external benefits,
Critics have raised numerous concerns about
whether foreign-owned firms in the United
States behave differently than U.S. firms and
whether this behavior might be detrimental to
U.S. interests. These concerns do not stand up
to empirical scrutiny. For instance, more tech-
nology is being transferred into the United
States than out of the United States. The
research and development activity of foreign-
owned firms is similar to that of U,S. firms.
Compensation in foreign-owned firms is similar
to U.S. firms, suggesting that foreign ownership
is not replacing good jobs with bad ones. Final-
ly, while foreign-owned firms tend to import
more than they export, it is far from certain
that this is detrimental to U.S. interests,
Overall, foreign-owned companies are a posi-
tive factor in making the US. economy more
competitive and productive. Advocates of public
policies to deter foreign ownership should be
viewed with skepticism.
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